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daho has long recognized the right to
jury trial in civil cases. Indeed, the origins of the right are as old as the Gem
State itself. But what are the purposes underlying the right? And how has the right
been interpreted and applied by the Idaho
Supreme Court over the years?
This article will explore the legal origins of the right to jury trial in Idaho and
will delineate its laudatory purposes in
both criminal and civil cases. It will then
discuss selected decisions by the Idaho
Supreme Court evaluating the jury trial
right in civil cases, including (1) decisions
predictably and non-controversially limiting the scope of the right by requiring
jury trial demands to exercise the right
and allowing courts to grant motions for
new trial or directed verdict and judgment
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notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”)
without denigrating the right and (2)
decisions on less stable legal terrain, alternatively, limiting the right concerning
the Idaho legislature’s imposition of caps
on noneconomic damages and expanding
the right concerning the possible award of
front pay.
The article will next evaluate the relatively scant case law on the effect of judicial COVID-19 related orders on the right
to jury trial in civil cases, opining that delays caused by those orders will be permissible, but outright denial of, or prohibition
on, the exercise of the right will not. The
article will conclude by suggesting that,
because the right to jury trial preserves
one of our most democratic institutions,
Idaho courts should vigorously further the
right in future cases.

Origins of and purpose
underlying the right to
jury trial in civil cases
Article I, Section 7 of the Idaho Constitution was adopted by Idaho’s Framers
in 1890 and provides that “[t]he right of
trial by jury shall remain inviolate … .”1 In
construing Idaho’s jury trial right provision, the Idaho Supreme Court has noted
its historical origins, stating “[t]he right
to trial by jury always has been salient to
the American people. In no less a document than the Declaration of Independence, our nation’s founders grounded, in
part, their dissolution of political ties with
Great Britain on the King’s ‘depriving us,
in many cases, of the benefits of trial by
jury’.”2 To be sure, the right to a jury trial
has one of its most profound applications
in criminal cases, where “the Framers of

seen and heard, the merchant, the
mechanic, the farmer, the laborer;
these sit together, consult, apply
their separate experience of the
affairs of life to the facts proven, and
draw a unanimous conclusion. This
average judgment thus given it is
the great effort of the law to obtain.
It is assumed that twelve men know
more of the common affairs of life
than does one man, that they can
draw wiser and safer conclusions
from admitted facts thus occurring
than can a single judge.12

More recently, however, the right to a jury trial
in a civil case has shifted from a right not
readily waived to a right that must be asserted
and preserved by litigants to be enjoyed.

ago that decisions by those same average
citizens from the community can be more
informed and thoughtful than decisions
by a single individual or judge.7
Thus, in a personal injury case in the
1870s, a six-year old boy was injured while
playing on an unguarded turntable owned
and operated by a railroad company.8 The
jury awarded $7,500 for the boy’s injuries and the railroad company appealed.9
The Supreme Court rejected the railroad
company’s contention that, because the
facts were undisputed, the district judge,
rather than the jury, should have decided
the negligence issue in the case.10 Specifically, the Court held that, where reasonable deductions and inferences could be
drawn from undisputed facts on the issue
of negligence, the jury was the appropriate
decisionmaker.11
In so holding, the Court laid out the
rationale for its decision in stirring terms:
Twelve men of the average of the
community,
comprising
men
of education and men of little
education, men of learning and
men whose learning consists only
in what they have themselves

Over the years, these vaunted purposes have not prevented predictable limitations on the right to jury trial in civil cases
but have played out in mixed results in
cases where plaintiffs have sought to have
jurors as the final decision in the remedial
aspect of civil cases.

Three predictable and
noncontroversial limitations
Given the importance of the right to
jury trial in civil cases, the Idaho Supreme
Court held a number of years ago that
“[a] waiver of a jury trial will not be implied in doubtful cases”13 and a few years
later that “[w]e will not indulge in any presumption that a litigant has waived such a
fundamental right.”14
More recently, however, the right to a
jury trial in a civil case has shifted from
a right not readily waived to a right that
must be asserted and preserved by litigants to be enjoyed. Thus, Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 38 imposes the following
demand and waiver requirements concerning the right to jury trial in civil cases:

(b) On any issue triable of right by a
jury, a party may demand a jury trial, stating in such demand whether
the party will stipulate to a jury of
less than 12 persons, but at least 6.
_____________
(d) A party waives a jury trial unless
its demand is properly served
and filed. A proper demand may
be withdrawn only if the parties
consent.
Related, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 39
provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a) When a jury trial has been demanded under Rule 38, the action
must be designated on the register
of actions as a jury action. The trial
on all issues so demanded must be
by jury, unless:
(1) the parties or their attorneys
file a stipulation to a nonjury trial or
so stipulate on the record; or
(2) the court on motion or on
its own finds that on some or all of
those issues there is no right to a
jury trial.
(b) Issues on which a jury trial is not
properly demanded are to be tried
by the court. But the court may, on
motion, order a jury trial on any
issue for which a jury might have
been demanded.
Thus, under Rule 39(a), “once a proper
and timely demand has been made, the
trial is by jury…”15 Conversely, “[f]ailure to make a timely demand under Rule
38(b) constitutes a waiver of the right to
a jury trial.”16 In sum, to perfect a right
that the Idaho Constitution guarantees inviolate, litigants must satisfy the demand
requirements of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Motions for new trial
and the right to a jury trial
Arguably, any time a trial judge grants
a motion for new trial after a jury has rendered a verdict an incursion on the right
to a jury trial has occurred. However, Idaho appellate courts have made clear that
a trial judge’s ability to grant a new trial –
and the standards under which it may do
so – do not violate the state constitutional
right to a jury trial under Article I, Section
7, so long as the judge adheres to certain
procedural requirements.
the

both the federal and state constitutions
interposed juries of citizens between governments and those persons the governments have accused of wrong in order to
avert the abuse of authority.”3
However, the right to jury trial has long
applied to civil cases – under both Article
I, Section 7 in Idaho4 and under the Seventh Amendment.5 In civil cases, the right
to a jury trial reflects the belief that decisions by average citizens drawn from the
community will confer legitimacy on the
civil litigation process.6 Related, the United States Supreme Court made clear long
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The Idaho Court of Appeals, addressing a constitutional challenge to the abuse
of discretion standard for reviewing a trial
judge’s decision to grant a new trial, has
held as follows:
Agro-West next argues that the
“manifest abuse of discretion” standard violates Article I, Section 7
of the Idaho Constitution …. . As
to the alleged violation of the state
constitution, we note that the power
to grant new trials is not claimed to
be unconstitutional; rather it is the
wide discretion given to the district
court under the “manifest abuse
of discretion” standard of review,
which Agro-West claims “disturbs”
and “infringes” upon the jury’s role
as factfinders, and allegedly violates
the state constitution.
The constitutional right of trial by
jury has been interpreted to secure
that right as it existed at common
law when the Idaho Constitution
was adopted. … Before Idaho became a state, our territorial Supreme
Court had recognized the trial
court’s discretionary function in
ruling upon new trial motions. ….
After statehood, the court later
enunciated the “abuse of discretion” standard of review. .... Thus the
constitutional right to trial by jury
in civil cases, under the state constitution, is subject to the trial court’s
discretionary power to grant a new
trial. The limits of this power are
defined by the “abuse of discretion”
standard of review. Because the
discretionary power to grant a new
trial does not contravene the state
constitution, the abuse of discretion
appellate standard is also free from
constitutional infirmity.17
The Idaho Supreme Court has likewise
held that, where the trial judge discloses
his or her reasoning for granting or denying a motion for a new trial and/or remittitur or additur (unless those reasons
are obvious from the record itself), that
statement of reasons allows for “adequate
review of the decision of the trial court
[and thereby] … insure[s] the right to trial
by jury guaranteed by Art. 1, § 7 of the
Idaho Constitution.”18
Thus, given trial courts’ pre-Statehood
ability to grant a new trial after a jury had
rendered its verdict, it is not surprising
Advocate • May 2022

that trial courts have continued to be able
to exercise such discretion as long as both
appellate courts and trial courts adhere to
certain safeguards designed to protect the
right to jury trial guaranteed by the Idaho
Constitution.

Motions for directed verdict
or judgment notwithstanding
the verdict (JNOV) and the
right to a jury trial
A trial judge’s unwillingness to allow a
case to be resolved by a jury or to reverse
a jury’s verdict once it has been rendered
and direct a verdict or enter judgment
for one party over the other raises similar issues regarding possible incursion on
jury trial rights as granting a motion for
a new trial. Indeed, the effect on the parties’ right to a jury trial is even more pronounced in the directed verdict or JNOV
contexts, since a trial court’s granting a
motion for new trial merely sets aside a
verdict and leaves open the possibility that
either party may obtain a jury verdict in
a subsequent trial, while granting a motion for directed verdict or JNOV enters
judgment in favor of one party by either
bypassing or overriding a jury’s verdict.
These considerations notwithstanding, the Idaho Supreme Court has made
clear that, so long as the trial judge applies
a standard of review deferential to the
non-moving party on a motion for directed verdict (or JNOV), the court will not
offend the non-moving parties’ jury trial
rights if it grants the motion.19 Thus, the
Idaho high court, quoting federal case law,
has stated as follows:
If the court grants it (a motion for
directed verdict) no findings of fact
are necessary and upon review the
evidence must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the party against
whom the motion is made. . . .
We will therefore . . . disregard the
findings of fact of the trial court,
reviewing the entire evidence in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff
and giving him the benefit of all
reasonable inferences which may be
deduced from the evidence in his favor . . . . To adopt any other view in
a jury case is to risk the deprivation
of a plaintiff ’s right to trial by jury
under the Seventh Amendment.20

As with the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision on motions for new trials, its decision recognizing the power of trial court
– guided and constrained by standards favorable to the nonmoving party (typically,
the plaintiff) – to either grant a directed
verdict or reverse a jury’s verdict by granting JNOV is consistent with the jury’s and
judge’s rightful roles in our civil litigation
system. As such, the decision is not surprising.

Caps on non-economic
damages and the right
to a jury trial
In Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical
Center,21 the Idaho Supreme Court was
faced with several Idaho state constitutional challenges, including a right to jury
trial challenge, to the Idaho legislature’s
enactment of monetary caps on the ability of personal injury plaintiffs to recover
non-economic damages from defendant
tortfeasors.22 Specifically, the legislature
limited the amount of noneconomic damages a plaintiff prevailing under a negligence theory could receive from defendants to a sum certain even though a jury
might have awarded the plaintiff economic damages in an amount vastly exceeding
the capped amount.23
In resolving the right to jury trial
challenge, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that, although Art. I, Section 7
provides that the right to trial by jury was
to remain “inviolate” and plaintiffs’ right
to recover noneconomic damages from
tortfeasors existed at the time of adoption
of the Idaho Constitution, the legislature
had “the power to …modify common law
rights and remedies” at that time as well.24
As such, the Idaho legislature’s subsequent
imposition of caps on noneconomic damage awards did not violate Art. I, Section
7 generally.25
In addition, given the effect of caps
on a plaintiffs’ right to fully recover noneconomic damages, the Court made the
dubious statement that the legislature’s
imposition of caps “does not violate the
right to a jury trial because the statute
does not infringe upon the jury’s right to
decide cases.”26 In this regard, the Court
stated that “[t]he jury is still allowed to
act as the fact finder in personal injury
cases” and “[t]he statute simply limits
the legal consequences of the jury’s find-

Front pay in employment
cases and the right
to a jury trial
Approximately two years ago, in Smith
v. Glenns Ferry Highway Dist.,31 the Idaho
Supreme Court addressed and resolved
the issue of whether a plaintiff had a right
to a jury trial concerning her request for
an award of front pay in lieu of reinstatement in a Whistleblower Act case.32 In
concluding that plaintiff Joanie Smith
did have such right, the Court first “recognized that the constitutional right to a
jury trial applies only to legal claims and
not equitable claims.”33 The Court went on
to categorize front pay as a legal remedy,
distinguishing statutory schemes (such as
Title VII) treating front pay as equitable
relief and holding as follows:
Much has been made by the District
and the trial court of “front pay”
being a remedy in lieu of reinstatement. Clearly reinstatement is an
equitable remedy over which the
court alone holds control. However,

allowing an award of front pay as
an alternative to reinstatement does
not somehow transform front pay
into an equitable remedy. Front pay
is an alternative to reinstatement
“where reinstatement is made
unreasonable by hostility between
the parties[.] … The impracticality
of forcing parties back into a fractured employment relationship does
not somehow transform front pay—
money damages—into an equitable
remedy rather than a legal remedy.
Front pay is offered as a legal alternative, not as an equitable replacement.
Accordingly, the trial court erred as
a matter of law in holding that Smith
was not entitled to have the jury decide the issue of front pay. The issues
of front and back pay should have
been left in the hands of the jury as
a matter of state constitutional law
and statutory interpretation.34
Unlike the Idaho Supreme Court’s
decision in Kirkland, the Idaho high
court’s decision in Smith gives full vitality to Idaho’s constitutional jury trial right
guarantee and, indeed, did so in the face
of contrary authority under other statutory schemes taking the issue of front pay
away from the jury. For this, the Court
should be lauded.

Delays in civil jury
trials caused by the
COVID - 19 pandemic
The Idaho judicial system, like so many
of its counterparts in other states, has been
greatly affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, which began in March 2020.35 Although Idaho appellate decisions recount
the various pandemic-related health and
safety orders prohibiting in the near term
or delaying jury trials issued by the Idaho
Supreme Court36 and Idaho trial courts,37
Idaho courts have had no occasion to address the issue of whether delays in civil
jury trials caused by those orders violated
a litigant’s constitutional right to a jury trial.38 This author has not been able to locate
any decisions by courts in other jurisdiction that have addressed the issue either,
although one court held that a 13-month
delay in civil commitment due to a pause
on jury trials to protect public health
during the COVID-19 pandemic did not

shock the conscience and, therefore, did
not violate plaintiff ’s substantive due process rights.39
Appellate courts outside of Idaho have
made clear, however, that complete denial
of or prohibition on (as opposed to a delay concerning) the right to jury trial in
civil cases is a bridge too far, holding that
“emergency orders issued by the … [state]
Supreme Court in response to natural disasters such as the pandemic that result
in jury trial delays and juror shortages
[in civil cases] may not support denial of
a party’s constitutional right to a jury trial.”40 Applying this standard, those same
appellate courts have granted petitions for
writs of mandamus requiring jury trials
when trial courts have relied on pandemic-related orders delaying trials issued by
the state Supreme Court to justify denying
a litigant’s jury trial right altogether.41
Although several of the Idaho Supreme Court’s pandemic-related orders
speak of “prohibiting” jury trials, most
(but not all) of the prohibitions specify
end dates concerning the duration of the
orders.42 Thus, the Supreme Court’s orders should be properly understood as delaying, rather than prohibiting, civil and
criminal trials.43 Certainly, delaying civil
jury trials can be injurious to litigants —
for reasons beyond delaying resolution of
the case by a jury.
As just one example, the parties – particularly, a defendant (or its insurer) – will
be reluctant to part with dollars to settle
a case without the prospect of a jury trial
immediately hanging over the parties’
heads.44 However, given the strong and
countervailing judicial interest in protecting the health and safety of all stakeholders involved in the jury trial process
during the pandemic, pandemic-related
orders delaying the parties’ exercise of the
right to a jury trial in a civil case almost
certainly does not rise to the level of violating that inviolable right. Only complete
prohibition concerning enjoyment of the
right itself would cross the state constitutional line under Article I, Section 7.

Conclusion
The right to jury trial guaranteed by
the Idaho Constitution preserves one of
our most democratic institutions. Although several Idaho Supreme Court decisions making incursions on the right to
the

ing.”27 Disagreeing with the statement
made by other courts that the procedure
for administering caps “plays lip service to
the form of the jury but robs the institution of its function,” the Court held that
the legislature’s adoption of caps limiting
plaintiffs’ recovery of noneconomic damages “does not violate the right to jury trial
as guaranteed by Article I, § 7 of the Idaho
Constitution.”28
Certainly, the Idaho Supreme Court’s
decision rejecting a constitutional jury trial right challenge to caps on noneconomic
damages can be supported by decisions
on similar issues in other jurisdictions.29
However, a near equal number of decisions outside of Idaho have concluded that
such caps violate jury trial right guarantees.30 Moreover, although the Idaho high
court attempts to suggest otherwise, imposition of caps on noneconomic damages
reducing the amount of damages a plaintiff may recover from a higher amount of
damages awarded by a jury fails to respect
the jury’s decision on the matter, alters the
outcome of the case when a jury has fairly
performed the duties assigned to it, and,
as such, does infringe on the jury’s right to
decide cases. For these reasons, the Idaho
Supreme Court’s decision on the jury trial
right issue in Kirkland was regrettable.
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jury trial in civil cases have been predictable and justified, other decisions have led
to mixed results concerning enforcement
of the right and were not preordained.
And, of course, the COVID-19 pandemic
has led to new challenges impacting the
preservation of the jury trial right, delaying (but not denying) the exercise of the
right based on legitimate health and safety
concerns. Hopefully, going forward, the
Idaho high court will give a robust interpretation to the constitutional guarantee
and err on the side of furthering the right
in close cases.
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